

COMMUNITY RISK REGISTER MANUAL

Version 4.0

Document Review and Version Control

| Document Title | Leicester, Leicestershire & Rutland (LLR) Prepared Community Risk Register Manual | | | |
|--------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Aim | Provide a register of risks in Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. | | | |
| Protective Marking | OFFICIAL – LRF Use Only | | | |
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| Last Reviewed By | Stuart Brewer (Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service) | | | |
| Validation Process | All contents, amendments and variations within this Manual will be subject to full consultation with all LLR Prepared partners and validation by the Executive Board | | | |
| Sign off Signature | Simon Cole – Chief Constable – Leicestershire Police Chair of LLR Prepared | | | |

DOCUMENT REVIEW

| Date of Review | Type of Review After Use (A) Scheduled Review (S) Training (T) Exercising (E) | Suitable / Unsuitable (S/U) | Details |
|-------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| 06/05/10 | S | S | Amended following annual review of Community Risk register. |
| 02/12/12 | S | S | Amended following annual review of Community Risk register. |
| 12/02/14 | S | S | Amended following annual review of Community Risk register. |
| 20/01/15 | S | S | Complete review following changes to risk assessment and management process |
| 13/9/16 | S | S | Amended following annual review of Community Risk register. |

| Date of | Type of Review | Suitable / Unsuitable | Details |
|----------|--|-----------------------|---|
| Review | After Use (A) Scheduled Review (S) Training (T) Exercising (E) | (S/U) | |
| 20/07/18 | S | S | Amended following annual review of Community Risk register. |

AUDIT OF AMENDMENTS

A list of amendments prior to January 2014 can be found in archived versions of the Community Risk Register.

| Date | Paragraph Changed | Brief details of alterations | Approved by | |
|----------|----------------------|--|-------------|--|
| 12/02/14 | Various | Amended to reflect changes in national guidance | S Brewer | |
| 12/02/14 | Section 6 & 7 | Revised CRR Top 10 and CRR summary table inserted | S Brewer | |
| 20/01/15 | Various | Complete review following change in CRR process | S Brewer | |
| 25/07/16 | Section 6 & 7 | Revised CRR and CRR Risk Matrix S Brewer | | |
| 25/07/16 | Various | Minor wording changes S Brewer | | |
| 25/07/16 | Section 5.3 | Inclusion of detail regarding the Risk S Brewer Assessment Working Group | | |
| 20/07/18 | Various | Amended to reflect changes in national guidance | S Brewer | |

FOREWORD

This document to assist LLR Prepared partner agencies and members of the public to gain a greater understanding of the process undertaken in compiling the Community Risk Register.

LEGISLATION

The Community Risk Register has been produced in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning Regulations 2005). The purpose of this Register is to record those risks that have been identified by LLR Prepared, the Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Local Resilience Forum (LRF), that may impact on our local communities.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 places a statutory duty upon key responding and supporting agencies to prepare for and respond to emergencies.

Part 1 of the Act establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each.

Category 1 Responders are those organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (e.g. Emergency Services, Local Authorities, NHS bodies, Port Health Authority and Environment Agency). Category 1 Responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties.

They will be required to:

- Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency
- Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
- Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
- Put in place Emergency Plans
- Put in place Business Continuity Management arrangements
- Put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency
- Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about Business Continuity Management (Local Authorities only)

Category 2 Responders include organisations such as the Health and Safety Executive, Transport, Utility Companies and the Voluntary Sector Organisations. These "co-operating bodies" are less likely to be involved in the core planning work but may be heavily involved in incidents.

Category 1 and 2 organisations come together to form "Local Resilience Forums" (based on police areas) which will help co-ordination and co-operation between responders at local level. Leicester, Leicestershire & Rutland Prepared locally fulfils this requirement.

COMMUNITY RISK REGISTER MANUAL

1. INTRODUCTION

This document is intended to:

- help members of the public gain a greater understanding of the process behind the creation of the Community Risk Register;
- to provide easier access to the information detailing those risks considered to provide the greatest challenge to the public and planners of the LLR area; and
- to inform the planning priorities for emergency responders and the various supporting agencies

The inclusion of any risk or threat within the Register indicates that an assessment has been carried out in relation to the likelihood and impact of an event taking place, together with the potential consequences to our communities.

LLR Prepared is tasked with producing contingency plans to effectively deal with the risks or threats contained within the Register, which may be obtained by request from the LLR Prepared Office.

In accordance with the Regulations, some detailed information relating to specific risks or threats may not be published in this document in order to safeguard national security, and protect the confidentiality of the information. The potential impacts of a terrorist incident in the LLR area have been considered as part of the development of local Consequence management arrangements. Response and recovery arrangements for such incident are embedded within local training programmes and plans.

There is also a National Risk Register which can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-risk-register-of-civil-emergencies.

Both this manual and the Community Risk Register are working documents, which will remain under continual review. They will be subject to various amendments from time to time.

Any questions relating to this document should be directed to the LLR Prepared Office by email at emergency.management@leics.gov.uk or in writing to:

LLR Prepared 1 Romulus Court Meridian East Meridian Business Park Leicestershire LE19 1YG

2. RISK TERMINOLOGY

To better understand the "Risk" in any area it is necessary to be aware of the various terms used and what they mean. The Risk Assessment process used by the Leicester, Leicestershire & Rutland Prepared is taken from the Statutory Guidance "Emergency Preparedness" which supports the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

A summary of useful definitions taken from this Guidance and other supporting documentation is shown below:

- RISK is defined as a product of the likelihood and impact of a given hazard or threat.
- **HAZARD** for the purpose of this process describes the potential to cause harm by something "accidental or naturally occurring".
- **THREAT** for the purpose of this process describes the potential to cause harm as a result of intentional and/or malicious actions.
- IMPACT is a measure of the severity of the potential harm caused by the hazard or threat. In this Risk Assessment process the impacts on **health**, the **economy**, the **environment** and **social impacts** are considered.

Each impact is given a rating of 1 to 5, described as:

- 1 = Limited
- 2 = Minor
- 3 = Moderate
- 4 = Significant
- 5 = Catastrophic
- **LIKELIHOOD** is the probability of an incident related to a hazard or threat, occurring over the next five years.

The likelihood is given a rating of 1 to 5, described as:

- 1 = Low
- 2 = Medium Low
- 3 = Medium
- 4 = Medium High
- 5 = High

3. FURTHER INFORMATION

All Local Resilience Forums in England use the risk assessment methodology as supplied by Central Government. This helps to minimise variation in the risk assessments due to the use of differing risk assessment methodology.

Given below are more detailed tables and descriptions of the key risk terms taken from the Statutory Guidance. The full Guidance can be found on the UK Resilience website by clicking. www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx

3.1 IMPACT SCORING SCALES – QUALITATIVE MEASURES

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of impact | Description of impact | |
|-------|------------|----------------------|--|--|
| 1 | Limited | Economic | Millions | |
| | | Fatalities | <10 | |
| | | Casualties | <10 | |
| | | Social Disruption | Essential Services - Transport | Key local transport services disrupted for 3-7 days |
| | | | Essential Services - Food and Water | Localised disruption to choice of foods for 3-7 days Loss of confidence or disruption to drinking water supplies locally for 2-3 days |
| | | | Essential Services – Fuel, Gas & Electricity | Fuel: Localised of supply leading to no fuel available at >1% of national forecourts lasting for at least 2 days Gas: Loss supply to >10,000 consumers > 5days Electricity: Loss of or major disruption of supply to >10000 people for >18hrs |
| | | | Essential Services - Finance | Severe local disruption to cash supply, acquisition and/or card transactions for 2-3 days; OR Loss/disruption of systems or firms which could result in £millions economic losses (infrastructure not affected) but disruption is localised with no systemic risk |
| | | | Essential Services - Communications | Loss or major disruption for a significant period of time (>4hrs) to voice and data networks that serve a small town or village or interconnections between those networks |
| | | | Education | Disruption to schools leading to the loss of 10 – 100k pupil days, OR Significant structural damage to 25 schools – for example 25 schools closed for between |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of | Description of impact | |
|-------|------------|-------------------|----------------------------|---|
| | | impact | | 1 and 12 days |
| | | | Access to Healthcare | Levels of activity challenging services and NHS organisations at a local level Short term excessive demands on hospitals leading to short term (1 – 5 days) suspension of some elective procedures locally |
| | | | Access to Criminal Justice | No immediate impact on courts / prisons A single police force engaged in local consequence management of incidents in up to 2 locations where there may have been a declaration of a major incident |
| | | | Evacuation & Shelter | Evacuation: Dispersal of a large number of people from a largely non-residential area (e.g. city centre evacuation due to a bomb threat <1000 people evacuated from residential properties (e.g. 1 – 2 residential streets evacuated due to a gas leak) Shelter: <1000 people require short term (hours – days) shelter or alternative accommodation (e.g. gas explosion) |
| | | | Environment | Localised short term (less than 1 year) environmental damage contamination |
| | | Psychological | Public Outrage | Insignificant Limited reputation impact No authority or person perceived to be culpable or incompetent Impact targeted on one particular group associated with the Government (rather than being indiscriminate) Little symbolic value |
| | | | Public Perception | Limited impact, owing to small numbers of public perceiving the risk as relevant to daily life Less than tens of thousands of people feel more vulnerable Public perception that the event will not occur again Little to no change in people's routines and normal behaviors (e.g. short term avoidance of transport modes or geographic locations across a small segment of population). Risk to children if future generations believed to be limited Strong public familiarly with / understanding of the risk and its consequences The risk is familiar and well understood. |
| 2 | Minor | Economic | Tens of millions of £ | |
| | | Fatalities | <10 | |
| | | Casualties | <10 | |
| | | Social Disruption | Essential Services - | Key regional transport services disrupted for 3 – 7 days |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of | Description of impac | t extended to the second of th |
|-------|------------|---------------|--|--|
| | | impact | Transport Essential Services - Food and Water Essential Services - | Severe disruption to local transport services for 1 – 2 weeks Regional disruption to choice of foods for 3 – 7 days. Loss of confidence or disruption to drinking water supplies across one or more regions for 2 – 3 days. |
| | | | Fuel, Gas & Electricity | Fuel: Loss of supply to a region leading to no fuel available at >5% of national forecourts lasting for at least 2 days. Gas: Loss of supply to >30,000 consumers for > 14 days (gas). Electricity: |
| | | | Essential Services – Finance | Regional disruption to cash supply, acquisition and/ or card transactions for 2 – 3 days OR severe local disruption up to 1 week; OR> Loss/disruption of infrastructure, systems or firms that either process volumes or values of transactions on behalf of other financial institutions, or whose loss could cause closure or disruption to market(s). However, likelihood of systematic risk is remote. |
| | | | Essential Services – Communications | Loss of a national timing source or loss or disruption for a significant period of time (>2hrs) to voice and data networks that serve a small town or village or interconnections between those networks. |
| | | | Education | Disruption to schools leading to the loss of 100 – 500k pupil days, OR Significant structural damage to 50 schools – for example 50 schools closed for between 6 and 29 days. |
| | | | Access to Health Care | Evidence of significantly increased activity at a local level. Activity is placing real pressure on organizations. Some reduction in outpatient activity. Outages of some drugs and devices (1 – 3 days supply). Deterioration in the weather conditions or severe weather forecast that threatens to cause widespread disruptions (e.g. Level 2 of heat wave and Level 3 cold weather plan). NHS identifies need for regional command control of NHS services to be invoked. Significant reduction in local social care provision. |
| | | | Access to Criminal Justice | Police engaged in local consequence management of incidents in up to 5 locations, where there may have been a declaration of major incident or is affecting local service delivery for up to 24 hours. Non-urgent court hearings delayed/reschedule. Short term decrease in capability at border results on increased ingress of illicit goods |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of | Description of impact | | |
|-------|------------|-------------------|---|--|--|
| | | impact | | | |
| | | | | and people for few hours. Short term pressure to respond to particular issues due to increases risk/volume means resources unable to deal with other issues. | |
| | | | Evacuation & Shelter | Evacuation: Medium-scale evacuation of 1,000-25,000 people from residential area (e.g. parts of a town evacuated due to unexploded ordnance). Resources required: local responders possibility with mutual aid or national support. Shelter: 1,000-25,000 people require short term (hours to days) shelter or alternative accommodation (e.g. surface water flooding). | |
| | | | Environment | Localised medium term (more than 1 year) environmental damage/contamination. | |
| | | Psychological | Public Outrage | Significant but localised and temporary. Some reputational impact. Consequences are largely one-off Public acceptance that the risk was a natural disaster or unavoidable and largely not caused/exacerbated by human failure. | |
| | | | | Little symbolic value of site of target. | |
| | | | Public Perception | Minor impact owing to moderate numbers of public/ a single community or population sub-group perceiving the risk as relevant to daily life. Tens of thousands of UK citizens feel more vulnerable. Public perception that the event in unlikely to occur again. Minor, localised and temporary changes in people's normal routines Short to medium-term avoidance of transport modes or geographic locations across a small segment of the population. Minor, localized and temporary uptake in both recommended and non-recommended behaviors. Moderate level of public familiarity with the risk. Good public understanding of the risk. | |
| 3 | Moderate | Economic | Hundreds of millions of £ | | |
| | | Fatalities | 51 – 100 | | |
| | | Casualties | Hundreds of casualties with moderate number of people presenting clinical psychological conditions. | | |
| | | Social Disruption | Essential Services - Transport | Severe disruption to key local transport services for 2-4 weeks. Widespread disruption to key national transport corridors or London commuter routes for 3-7 days. Severe disruption to key regional transport services for 1-2 weeks. Disruption to international travel for 3-7 days. | |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of impact | Description of impac | t |
|-------|------------|----------------------|--|---|
| | | | Essential Services - Food and Water | National disruption to choice of foods for 3-7 days. Loss of confidence or disruption to drinking water supplies locally for up to one week. |
| | | | Essential Services – Fuel, Gas & Electricity | Fuel: Loss of supply to a region or more than one region leading to no fuel available at >10% of national forecourts for at least 2 days. Gas: Loss of supply to >250k consumers for >28 days. Electricity: Loss of or major disruption to electricity supply to >300k consumers for >18 hours. |
| | | | Essential Services – Finance | National disruption to cash supply, acquisition and/or card transactions for 2 – 3 days OR regional disruption up to 1 week OR severe local disruption over 1 week; OR>1 week loss of financial infrastructure, major retail or settlement bank; OR |
| | | | | Loss disruption of infrastructure, system or firms that either process significant volumes or values of transactions on behalf of other financial institutions, or whose loss could result in closure of major disruption to the market(s), thereby increasing likelihood of systemic risk within the UK financial services, but imperfect substitutes may be available.>2 day disruption to multiple financial infrastructure. |
| | | | Essential Services – Communications | Loss or major disruption for > 30 minutes to voice and data networks that serve a county or regional city of population >1m or two or more cities of population >500k or interconnections between those networks. |
| | | | Education | Disruption to schools leading to the loss of 500k-5m pupil days – for example all schools in a region closed for 3 days or more; OR Significant structural damage to 100 schools – for example 100 schools closed for between 14 and 144 days. |
| | | | Access to Health Care | Evidence of significantly increased activity within a region which is placing severe pressure of the majority of NHS organizations. Short term cancellation of all elective NHS delivery locally for up to 4 weeks. Longer term diversion of some A&E departments. Reduction in outpatient activity. Delays in response times to NHS 111. Outage of some drugs and devices with delay in resupply [3 + days]. Ambulance REAP status 4: severe pressure Extended period of severe weather causing widespread disruption to the NHS; with no |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of | Description of impact | t |
|-------|------------|---------------|---------------------------|--|
| | | impact | Access to Criminal | imminent improvement anticipated. NHS E identifies need for regional command control of NHS services to be invoked. Loss of/or failure of NHS critical infrastructure. Reduction in regional social care provision. |
| | | | Justice | Police engaged in consequence management at a regional level where there will have been a declaration of major incident and business continuity plans have been implemented. Incidents are affecting local service delivery for up to 2 days. Emergency provisions for dealing with custodial cases are being considered. Border security checks incomplete; increase in illicit goods and people entering the country for few days. Additional courts (evenings and weekends to provide swift justice and ease pressure on police custody facilities. Isolate prison disturbances result in local lockdown and closure to new receipts. Vigilante action takes place in some limited regions of the UK (few areas in cities). |
| | | | Evacuation and Shelter | Evacuation: Dispersal of a large number of people together with a medium-scale evacuation of 1,000-25,000 people from residential area (e.g. part city centre and surrounding residential evacuation due to an unspecific bomb threat). Resources required: local responders with mutual aid or national support. |
| | | | | Shelter: 25,000-100,000 people require short-term (hours to days) shelter. 1,000-25,000 people require medium term (days to weeks) or long-term (months to years) alternative accommodation (e.g. reservoir flooding). Resources required: local responders with mutual aid or national support. |
| | | | Environment | Localised long term (more than 5 years) environmental damage/contamination. |
| | | Psychological | Public Outrage | Serious, widespread public outrage. Serious reputational impact with some pressure for resignations. Consequences will not just be one-off. High impact on those perceived as vulnerable (i.e. elderly, women, children). Public perception that the disruptive outcome was a result of someone/ the Government's failure. Limited outrage directed at communities to which perpetrators are believed to be affiliated (e.g. through race, ethnicity, political or religious approach). High symbolic value. |
| | | | Public Perception | Moderate impact owing to large numbers of the public/ multiple communities or |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of | Description of impact | | |
|-------|-------------|---|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| | | impact | | | |
| | | | | population subgroups perceiving the risk as relevant to daily life. 100s of thousands of UK citizens feel more vulnerable. Short-medium term changes in peoples' routine such as medium term avoidance of some modes of transport or geographic locations. Moderate uptake in both recommended and not-recommended behaviors. Shortage of essential supplies due to the perceived need to stock up on essentials (e.g. panic-buying). Public perception that the event could occur again. Impact was indiscriminate (as opposed to being focused on specific group such as Government officials or industrial workers). Feelings of lack of control/ helplessness. Some concern about potential health risk to future generations. Limited public understanding of the risk. Limited social conflict and community tensions resulting from fear-induced behaviors. | |
| 4 | Significant | Economic | Billions of £ | | |
| | J | Fatalities | 101 - 1000 | | |
| | | Casualties | Thousands of casualties wi | th significant numbers of people presenting clinical psychological conditions. | |
| | | Social Disruption | Essential Services - Transport | Severe disruption to key regional transport services for > 2 weeks. Severe widespread disruption to key national transport corridors or London commuter routes for 1-2 weeks. | |
| | | | | Severe disruption to transport internationally 7-14 days. | |
| | | Essential Service Food and Water Essential Service Fuel, Gas Electricity | Food and | National disruption to supply (shortages) of essential foods for 3-7 days. Loss of confidence or disruption to drinking water supplies nationally for 2-3 days. Loss of confidence or disruption to drinking water supplies across one or more regions | |
| | | | 1 ' | Fuel: Loss of supply to more than one regions leading to no fuel available at a >20% of national forecourts up to one week. Gas: Loss of supply >1m consumers for 28 days. Electricity: Loss of, or major disruption to electricity supply to 1m people for >18 hours. | |
| | | | Essential Services – Finance | National disruption to cash supply, acquisition and/or card transactions up to 1 week OR regional disruption over 1 week; OR Loss/disruption of infrastructure that process high volumes AND values of transactions | |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of impact | Description of impac | ct |
|-------|------------|----------------------|--|---|
| | | | | (i.e. £100bns and 1000s of transactions per day), posing strong likelihood of systematic risk within the UK financial services (key operations, systems and markets affected). Imperfect substitutes may be available, including previous methods of business; OR Loss/disruption of infrastructure causing loss or major disruption to the Government operating its secondary functions. Imperfect substitutes may be available, including previous methods of business. |
| | | | Essential Services – Communications | Loss or major disruption for > 1 hour to international connectivity points, OR National mobile telecommunications networks: OR voice and data networks that serve London or three or more cities of population >1m; OR interconnections between those networks. |
| | | | Education | Disruption to schools leading to the loss of 500k – 5m pupil days for example all schools in 2 larger (i.e. London, NW, SE) or 3 other regions closed for 3 days or more; OR Significant structural damage to 250 schools – for example 250 schools closed for between 58 and 231 days. |
| | | | Access to Health Care | National disruption to the availability NHS services with significant disruption to NHS delivery of up to 4 – 12 weeks. Widespread diversion of several A&E departments. Significant delays in response times to NHS 111. National shortage of some key medical drugs and devices (3 days to 3 weeks). Significant medium term reduction in social care provision. Ambulance REAP status 5: critical. Exceptional weather is affecting one or several parts of the country and is so severe that it is creating widespread transport disruption and the operation of health and social care is threatened. |
| | | | Access to Criminal Justice | Police engaged in local consequence management at national level where there will have been multiple declarations of major incidents and business continuity plans have been widely implemented. Incidents are affecting local service delivery for more than 5 days and emergency provisions for dealing with custodial cases have been implemented. Border security fails with uncontrolled migration and transit of goods and people. All routine court activity postponed; only emergency arrangements remaining. Prisons unable to take more receipts; prison riot damage prevents re-housing. Vigilantism breaks out across large part of the UK. |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of impact | Description of impact | |
|-------|------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--|
| | | | Evacuation & Shelter | Evacuation: >100,000 people evacuated from residential area (e.g. major coastal flooding). Resources required: local responders with mutual aid and national support. Shelter: >100,000 people require short-term (hours to days) shelter (e.g. major coastal flooding). >100,000 people require medium-term (days to weeks) or long-term (months to years) alternative accommodation (e.g. nuclear incident). Resource required: local responders with mutual aid and national support. |
| | | | Environment | Medium term (more than 1 year) environmental damage/contamination to one region or city. |
| | | Psychological | Public Outrage | Serious nationwide concern, with strong calls for Government action. Some outage (e.g. through race, ethnicity, political or religious The adverse impact was intentional/ malicious. Significant reputational impact with domestic pressure for resignations – public perception that Government/ an organization/ a person significantly failed. Risk results from human agency rather than natural disaster. Consequences will be long-term rather than just one-off. Indiscriminate and very significant impact. Significant impact on those perceived as vulnerable (i.e. elderly, women, children). Very high symbolic value. |
| | | | Public Perception | High impact owing to large numbers of the public perceiving risk as relevant to daily life. Millions of UK citizens feel more vulnerable. Sustained changes in people's normal routines. Sustained uptake in both recommended ad non-recommended behaviors. Intense and widespread information seeking by the public. High levels of concern about risks to children/ future generations. High levels of concern that catastrophic event could occur again. Impact was indiscriminate and affected large (i.e. >1,000) number of people (as opposed to being focused on a specific group such as Government officials or industrial workers). Significant sense of helplessness / lack of control. Some social conflict and community tensions resulting from fear-induced behaviors. Lack of familiarity of risk. Lack of informed public knowledge or understanding of the risk. |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of impact | Description of impac | t | | | |
|-------|--------------|------------------------------|---|---|--|--|--|
| 5 | Catastrophic | Economic | Tens of billions of £ | | | | |
| | | Fatalities | >1000 | | | | |
| | | Casualties | Tens of thousands of casu | ualties with very significant numbers of people presenting clinical psychological conditions. | | | |
| | | Social Disruption | Essential Services – Transport | Severe widespread disruption to key national transport corridors or London commuter routes for >2 weeks. | | | |
| | | | Face all of Care land | Severe disruption to transport internationally >14 days. Notice of disruption to constant and a second of constant for the formula of the second of th | | | |
| | | | Essential Services – | National disruption to supply (shortages) of essential foods for more than 1 week. | | | |
| | | | Food & Water | Loss of confidence or disruption to drinking water supply locally or across one or more regional for over 1 week. | | | |
| | | Essentia Commu Educati | Essential Services – Fuel, Gas, Electricity Essential Services – Finance Essential Services – | Fuel: National loss of supply leading to no fuel available at >20% of national forecourts lasting for over a week. Gas: Loss of >20% of national demand for >24 hours. Electricity: National loss of electricity supply for any period. Regional loss of, or major disruption to electricity supply for > 1 week. National disruption to cash supply, acquisition and/or card transactions for over 1 week; OR Loss/disruption of core infrastructure that process high volumes AND values transactions (i.e. £100bns and 1000s of transactions per day), posing systematic risk for UK and/or international financial markets. No (or very limited) alternatives available; OR Loss/disruption of infrastructure causing loss or major disruption to the Government operating its secondary functions. No (or very limited) alternatives available. Loss of service nationally for 3 working days, including backbone networks that provide | | | |
| | | | Communications | national voice and data services and interconnections between those networks. | | | |
| | | | Education | Disruption to schools leading to the loss 20m pupil days – for example all schools in the country closed for 3 days or more; OR Significant structural damage to 500 schools – for example 500 schools closed for 115 days or more. | | | |
| | | | Access to Health Care | Prolonged national disruption to the availability of with significant disruption to NHS delivery > 12 weeks. Closure of serval A&E departments. NHS 111 system failure. | | | |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of | Description of impac | ct |
|-------|------------|---------------|----------------------------|---|
| | | impact | | |
| | | | | National long-term shortage of medical drugs and devices. Widespread and prolonged reduction in social care provision. Ambulance REAP status 6: potential service failure. |
| | | | Access to Criminal Justice | Police engaged in local consequence management at national level where will have been multiple declarations of major incidents and business continuity plans have been widely implemented. Incidents are affecting local service delivery for more than 5 days and emergency provisions for dealing with custodial cases have been implemented. Border security fails with uncontrolled migration and transit of goods and people. All routine court activity postponed; only emergency arrangements remaining. Prisons unable to take more receipts; prisons riot damage prevents re-housing. Vigilantism breaks out across large part of the UK. |
| | | | Evacuation & Shelter | Evacuation: > 100,000 people evacuated from residential area (e.g. major coastal flooding). Resources required: local responders with mutual aid and national support. Shelter: > 100,000 people require short-term (hours to days) shelter (e.g. major coastal flooding). > 100,000 people require medium term (days to weeks) or long term (months to years) alterative accommodation (e.g. nuclear incident). Resources required: local responders with mutual aid and national support. |
| | | | Environment | Long term (more than 5 years) environmental damage/contamination to one region or city. |
| | | Psychological | Public Outrage | Extreme, nationwide, sustained public outrage. Widespread calls for severe Governmental reprisals (i.e. the adverse impact was intentional/ malicious). Significant outrage directed at communities to which perpetrators are believed to be affiliated (e.g. through race, ethnicity, political or religious approach). Widespread reputational impact, with persistent and sustained domestic pressure for resignations at national / CEO level. Consequences will be long-term rather than one-off. Risk results from human agency rather than natural disaster. Indiscriminate and catastrophic impact. Severe impact on those perceived as vulnerable (i.e. elderly, women, children). Very high symbolic value. |

| Level | Descriptor | Categories of impact | Description of impact |
|-------|------------|----------------------|--|
| | | | Extreme, widespread, prolonged impact owing to very large numbers of the public perceiving risk as relevant. Significant proportions of the UK population feel more vulnerable. Significant and sustained changes in people's normal routines. Significant uptake of both recommended and non-recommended behaviors. Widespread avoidance of an area. Widespread social conflict and community tensions resulting from fear-induced behaviour. Severe loss of confidence in government's ability to protect citizens. Severe and prolonged loss of confidence in the financial markets. Significant concern about risks to children or future generations. Belief that event is catastrophic. Significant concern that catastrophic event could occur again. Severe sense of helplessness / lack of control. Impact was indiscriminate and directly affected very large number of people (i.e. > 10,000) - perception that the adverse consequences could happen to anyone. Very little informed public knowledge or understanding of the risk. Very low familiarity of the risk. |

3.2 CATEGORIES OF IMPACT

| Category | Description |
|------------|--|
| Fatalities | The number of people killed by an event, directly or within the first year thereafter, including those that die as a result of cancellation or delay to medical treatment. Figures are either quoted as "excess fatalities" where the number is calculated as the number of fatalities over and above the expected for that period. Or, for immediate no or minimal notice events as the |
| | approximate number of expected fatalities. |

| Casualties | Those requiring medical intervention as a result of an event, either for chronic, acute or psychological effects. Calculation includes those whose existing condition deteriorates significantly as a result of the event (for example by delay to treatment), but not those who seek medical advice but do not receive an intervention, for example "worried well". |
|-------------------|--|
| Economic | This is a measure of the total net cost to the economy, including both direct and indirect costs and losses. Within the NRA this is expressed in terms of the annual impact on GDP and is calculated as the sum of: a) impact falling in year 1, and b) Total impact occurring in years 2-5. |
| Social Disruption | Classified as disruption to normal patterns of daily lives of the public. The elements underpinning the assessment are divided up between "Essential Services" and "Other Factors" (it is important to note that the difference between the two is relative and "Other Factors" are still acknowledged as a crucial part of the UK"s social infrastructure). "Essential Services" are defined as; Transport, Food and Water, Fuel/Gas, Electricity, Finance and Communications. "Other Factors" are defined as; Education, Access to Health Care, Evacuation, Shelter and Environment. |
| Psychological | Outrage aims to capture the sense of public outrage after an event has occurred. This may be directed towards those perceived to be responsible for the consequences of an event such as a terrorist group, or towards a company or the government for 'allowing' the event to occur. This dimension does not consider any perceived 'outrage' of the handling of the event after it has occurred (i.e. the multi-agency response). Anxiety assesses the sense of personal vulnerability/fear resulting from direct or indirect exposure to an event. Research indicates that anxiety will be greatest where individuals have a poor understanding of the risk, perceive that the event could happen again and is as likely to affect them as anybody else, and believe that there is little they can do to avoid this outcome. |

3.3 LIKELIHOOD SCORING SCALE

| Level | Descriptor | Stated chance in 5 years | Equated to one event every |
|-------|-------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | Low | Between 1 in 20,000 and 1 in 2000 | 10,000 to 100,000 years |
| 2 | Medium Low | Between 1 in 2000 and 1 in 200 | 1000 to 10,000 years |
| 3 | Medium | Between 1 in 200 and 1 in 20 | 100 to 1,000 years |
| 4 | Medium High | 1 in 20 and 1 in 2 | 10 to 100 years |
| 5 | High | 1 in 2 or more | 10 years or less |

3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Once the likelihood and impact for each hazard is established the risk is given one of four priority ratings that give an initial indication of relative importance of each risk for planning purposes within the LRF area. These are based on the standard table below:

| IMPACT | Catastrophic (5) | М | VH | VH | VH | VH |
|--------|------------------|------------|------------|--------|-------------|------|
| Ţ | Significant (4) | М | н | VH | VH | VH |
| | Moderate (3) | М | М | н | н | н |
| | Minor (2) | L | М | М | М | М |
| | Limited (1) | L | L | L | L | L |
| | | Low | Medium Low | Medium | Medium High | High |
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| | | LIKELIHOOD | | | | |

3.5 DEFINITIONS OF PRIORITY RATINGS

Very High (VH) Risk - May have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of (multiagency) planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular basis.

High (H) Risk - Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) generic planning, exercising and training for these risks should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular basis.

Medium (M) Risk - Should be monitored to ensure that they are being appropriately managed and consideration given to their being managed under generic arrangements.

Low (L) Risk - Should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category.

4. USING RISK ASSESSMENTS TO INFORM LOCAL PLANNING PRIORITIES

Local responding agencies within the LLR Prepared area use the Community Risk Register to help prioritise work undertaken to prepare for, and respond to, local emergencies. This is in line with the statutory responsibility placed on all Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) to plan and prepare a response for emergencies using a risk assessment based approach.

4.1 PRIORITISATION OF RISKS


To assist in prioritisation of effort and resource all risks are plotted on the Risk Assessment Matrix and then assigned a priority rating. These are defined as follows:

PRIORITY ONE RISKS - Risks which will be subject to a full assessment in the LLR Prepared Risk Treatment Process

PRIORITY TWO RISKS – Risks which will be considered as "Associated Risks" to Priority One Risks; i.e. they will be considered in line with the Priority One Risk that most closely produces the potential consequences arising from realization of the hazard in question, unless where materially different where a separate assessment will be undertaken

OTHER RISKS – Risks which LLR Prepared accepts as either having been addressed as far as possible within existing procedures to an extent where resources are better utilized elsewhere and/or are of low likelihood and limited impact and therefore the direct expenditure or resource on mitigation would be better utilized on other higher likelihood/impact risks.

(LLR Prepared MODEL)



A full summary of all the hazards considered as part of the Community Risk Register process and a completed Prioritisation Scoring Reference Table can be found in Section 7.

4.2 THE RISK TREATMENT PLAN

All Priority One Risks are subject to the development of a Risk Treatment Plan. All priority Two Risks will either have a dedicated plan or be associated to an existing Priority One Plan which has similar consequences / impacts. Each risk is assessed against the current level of preparation in the form of:

- Plans in place
- Training and Exercising undertaken
- Resources available/required People and Equipment

This is further linked to consideration of the seven national capabilities:

- Command & Control
- Warning and informing
- Interoperability
- Community and Corporate Resilience
- Resilient Telecommunications
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Recovery

Depending on the level of preparation and resources in place, each is then given a red, amber or green rating as follows:

| RATING | ACTION TIMESCALES |
|--------|-----------------------------------|
| RED | Action required in 0 – 12 months |
| AMBER | Action required in 12 – 24 months |
| GREEN | No further action required |

These ratings are then prioritised with RED risks receiving priority attention. Where resource does not allow for all risks to be addressed within timescales the relative position of the risk on the CRR Risk Assessment Prioritisation Reference Scoring Table, with a bias towards impact, is used to further prioritise workloads.

5. LEAD ASSESSOR, LEAD AGENCY FOR RESPONSE AND LRF RISK ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP

5.1 THE LEAD ASSESSOR

Each risk assessment has an allocated 'Lead Assessor.' This is the agency that holds overall responsibility for the assessment of the risk and will undertake the regular review of each assessment and related Risk Treatment Plan to ensure that it remains current and valid. The Lead

Assessor is not necessarily the agency that will lead the response to an occurrence of one of these events within the LLR area.

5.2 THE LEAD AGENCY FOR RESPONSE

The 'Lead Agency for Response' is that agency considered most likely to be leading the on the ground response during a major incident of the nature identified on the Community Risk Register. In addition to the identified Lead Agency for Response the Police will have a critical role to play in co-ordination of the multi-agency response and will in most cases chair any multi-agency Tactical or Strategic Group that may be required. For further information please see the LLR Prepared Major Incident Framework (available from the LLR Prepared Office).

5.3 THE LRF RISK ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP (RAWG)

The LLR Prepared Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) is a sub-group of the Local Resilience Forum. It has the responsibility for co-ordinating and validating the individual risk assessments before compiling them into the Community Risk Register.


The RAWG is made up of representatives from all Category One Responders with a specialist understanding of risk in the LRF area within their own particular field of expertise. Category Two Responders are invited to the meeting and to comment on risk assessments and treatment plans; this includes utility companies, East Midlands Airport and the Met Office amongst others.

The RAWG is currently chaired by Leicestershire Fire & Rescue Service and supported by the LLR Prepared Office.

The CRR is regularly submitted to the LRF Executive Board for approval.

6. CRR PRIORITISATION SCORING REFERENCE

Table of Hazard Identification can be found in Section 7



7. SUMMARY OF FULL COMMUNITY RISK REGISTER

The following table details a summary of all the hazards that have been assessed as part of the Leicester, Leicestershire & Rutland Prepared Community Risk Register process.

| Risk ref | SUB-CATEGORY | Likelihood | Impact | Overall Risk | Priority | Last Revised |
|----------|---|-----------------|------------------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| H1 | Accident - Gas Supply Infrastructure | 2 – Medium-Low | 3 – Moderate | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H4 | Accident - Hazardous Liquids Supply Infrastructure | 2 – Medium-Low | 4 – Significant | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H5 | Accident - Fuel Supply Infrastructure (Pipelines) | 1 – Low | 2 – Minor | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H7 | Gas Supply Infrastructure (High Pressure Pipelines) - Explosion at a high pressure gas pipeline | 1 – Low | 2 – Minor | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H9 | Hazmat - Toxic Chemical Release | 2 – Medium-Low | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H11 | Hazmat – radiation exposure from stolen goods | 2 – Medium-Low | 1 – Limited | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H12 | Hazmat - Biological Pathogen Release | 1 – Low | 2 – Minor | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H14 | Hazmat - Food Supply Contamination | 4 – Medium-High | 3 – Moderate | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H16 | Accident - Aviation Crash | 1 – Low | 4 – Significant | High | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H17 | Natural Hazard - Storms and gales | 4 –Medium-High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H18 | Natural Hazard - Cold and Snow | 4 – Medium-High | 4 – Significant | Very High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H19 | Natural Hazard - Coastal Flooding | 3 – Medium | 4 – Significant | Very High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H21 | Natural Hazard - Fluvial Flooding | 3 – Medium | 4 – Significant | Very High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H22 | Natural hazard - Surface Water Flooding | 3 – Medium | 3 – Moderate | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H23 | Disease - Pandemic Influenza | 4 –Medium-High | 5 – Catastrophic | Very High | P1 | 01.06.18 |

| Risk ref | SUB-CATEGORY | Likelihood | Impact | Overall Risk | Priority | Last Revised |
|----------|---|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| H24 | Disease - Emerging infectious diseases | 4 – Medium-High | 3 – Moderate | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H25 | Disease - Animals Disease | 3 – Medium | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H31 | Industrial Action - Fuel Tanker Drivers | 3 –Medium | 3 – Moderate | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H33 | Industrial Action - Prison Officers | 4 – Medium-High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H37 | Influx of British Nationals who are not normally resident in the UK | 4 – Medium High | 1 – Limited | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H38 | Infrastructure / System failure - Gas Supply Infrastructure | 2 – Medium Low | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H39 | Infrastructure / System failure - Water Supply Infrastructure | 2 – Medium-Low | 1 – Limited | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H40 | Infrastructure / System failure - Telecommunications | 3 – Medium | 1 – Limited | Low | Other | 01.06.18 |
| H41 | Infrastructure / System Failure – National electricity transmission | 3 – Medium | 4 – Significant | Very High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H45 | Regional Electricity Transmission | 4 – Medium High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H46 | Hazmat - Biological Substance Release | 4 – Medium High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H48 | Natural Hazard - Heatwave | 4 – Medium High | 3 – Moderate | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H50 | Natural Hazard - Drought | 3 – Medium | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H54 | Natural Hazard - Volcanic Eruption | 4 – Medium High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H56 | Natural Hazard – Severe Space Weather | 4 – Medium High | 3 – Moderate | High | P1 | 01.06.18 |
| H57 | Humanitarian - Public Disorder | 4 – Medium High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |

| H58 | Natural Hazard - Wildfires | 2 – Medium Low | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
|----------|--|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| H59 | Finance, Banking – Technological failure of the banking system | 2 – Medium Low | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| Risk ref | SUB-CATEGORY | Likelihood | Impact | Overall Risk | Priority | Last Revised |
| H60 | Hazmat – High consequences dangerous goods | 2 – Medium Low | 3 – Moderate | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H61 | Hazmat - Civil Nuclear | 1 – Low | 4 – Significant | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H62 | Natural Hazard - Poor Air Quality | 4 – Medium High | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |
| H63 | Natural Hazard - Earthquake | 2 – Medium Low | 2 – Minor | Medium | P2 | 01.06.18 |